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ABSTRACT 
This study concerns two potential channels for the transmission of monetary 
policy to the farm sector in the United States. The first one is the "money" channel 
where I use a relative-price model to explain the effect of monetary policy shocks on 
relative farm prices. The second one is the "credit" chaimel where I use the Flow of 
Funds Accoimts (FOFA) data to assess the effect of monetary policy shocks on net 
funds raised in the farm sector. 
The equilibrium relative-price model provides a linkage between monetary 
policy shocks and relative farm prices. The model shows that monetary policy can 
affect relative farm prices if aggregate price information is imperfect and if supply 
and demand elasticities in the farm and nonfarm sectors are different. The short-run 
elasticity of siipply of farm products is argued to be less than that of nonfarm products 
because of differences in the production processes. This characteristic of farm 
production causes relative farm prices to fall initially in response to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock. 
The credit channel for the transmission of monetary policy is another way 
monetary policy can affect the farm sector. The credit view holds that monetary 
policy affects the borrowing and lending activities of the farm sector primarily 
because it affects the extent of financial intermediation. It suggests that the amount of 
bank loans might also be an important indicator of the tightness of monetary policy. 
A "semi-structural" vector autoregression (VAR) model is used to develop two 
VAR based policy shock measures - the federal flmds rate and nonborrowed reserves. 
The effects of monetary policy shocks on the farm sector are then assessed using 
dynamic response functions obtained through the VAR model. 
Relative farm prices show a steady and persistent decline after a contractionary 
monetary policy shock, while net fimds raised in the farm sector increase for roughly 
a year then decline. The initial rise in the net funds raised reflects the difficulty for 
vi 
timers to quickly alter their nominal expenditures. Eventually, they reduce their 
nominal expenditures and net funds raised decline as predicted by the credit view. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet grain piirchase in 1972 sparked an unparalleled escalation in 
farmland values, which some believe set the stage for the farm debt crisis of the 
1980s. The perceived agricultural boom in the 1970s came to an end in the 1980s 
when the export boom collapsed with little warning causing commodity prices and 
farm income to worsen abruptly. The world of the heavily indebted farmers and their 
financial institutions crashed with astonishing speed. Not only did their income falter, 
especially in comparison with the gains they counted on, but also interest rates on 
their debt had risen to very high levels. And in short order, the value of their 
farmland, which had been based on expected higher income discounted at lower 
interest rates, began a rapid descent. As it became increasingly hard for farmers to 
repay their debts, the financial trouble spread to financial intermediaries with 
significant involvement in farm lending: commercial banks, life insurance companies, 
and the Farm Credit System (FCS)' (Peoples et al., 1992). 
The harsh awakening came when unexpectedly, after farmland values had 
quadrupled, price began to decline. Few, if any, thought the downtum would last as 
long as it did, from 1982 through 1986, and that on the average farmland would lose 
nearly two-thirds of its recorded value attained in 1981. Thousand would be force off 
the land, and many banks would close their doors and never reopen. 
Most agricultural analysts believe ±at the farm credit crisis of the 1980s had no 
single cause, but reflected the compound effects of a number of events and decisions 
' The FCS consists of a number of regionally based institutions that provide credit to farmers. It issues 
primarily short-term debt. Financial difficulties at a number of these institutions in the mid-1980s 
disrupted the system, leading to new legislation to recapitalize and restructure the Federal Farm Credit 
Bank System. Interest rate spreads over Treasury debt rose sharply during the crisis, peaking at about 
200 basis points compared with I to 5 basis points before the difficulties developed. As part of this 
legislation. Congress created the Farm Credit Financial Assistance Corporation (FACO) in 1987, which 
issued government guaranteed debt until 1992 to assist financially troubled Farm Credit Bank. The 
banks that borrowed from die agency are obligated to repay the loans in ftdl, although interest payments 
on the loan are paid partly by the Federal government. 
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(Peoples et al., 1992), some of which took place within the farm sector such as the 
export-led boom and bust, and others outside it such as inflation, interest rates, and 
foreign exchange rate. All of these changes reversed the conditions of the 1970s that 
had been so favorable to agriculture. However, if any factor stands out from the rest, 
it is rapid change in the level of real interest rates. Tight monetary policy that led to 
the collapse of inflation starting in 1980 turned real interest rates from being very low 
to very high. 
Neil Harl is one of the agricultural observers who puts the most blame for the 
"Farm Belt" economic woes suffered by so many farmers, agribusiness and others 
during the economic chaos of the 1980s largely on monetary policy pertaining mostly 
to inflation. Harl (1990) does cite the depression in farmland values as one of the 
most striking, and devastating, features of the farm debt crisis. "Falling land values 
cut enormous amounts of collateral value out of farm balance sheets." (Harl, p. 39). 
The downward spiral of the farm credit crisis reached bottom in 1986. A 
remarkable recovery ensued, based in large part on huge government income 
payments to farmers and the restoration of the operations and viability of the Farm 
Credit System. Also significant is Harl's suggestion that people leam from what 
happened in the 1980s, and that those lessons learned should help prevent a similar 
crisis from occurring again. 
The relationship between monetary policy and the price level is an important 
issue in macroeconomics. However, if sectoral prices respond differently, monetary 
disturbances can also have important relative price effects. Much research effort has 
been devoted to determine whether and how monetary policy affects relative sectoral 
prices. The question of interest in this study is whether changes in monetary policy 
affect relative farm prices - farm output prices relative to nonfarm output prices. The 
evidence on the response of relative farm prices to monetary policy shocks has been 
widely mixed (Isaac and Rapach, 1997). Empirical studies differ on whether 
monetary policy has significant and persistent effects on the agricultural sector. The 
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mixed findings have been due, in part, to the different theoretical models and 
empirical techniques that have been used. Examining this issue more closely is 
important for considering whether farm programs can or should be used to cushion 
against monetary policy shocks. 
Most previous monetary vector autoregression (VAR) studies used broad 
monetary aggregates such as the monetary base. Ml or M2 to model monetary policy 
and assess its effects on the farm sector. However, movements in these broad 
monetary aggregates are not completely determined by the Federal Reserve. The 
policy measure must be a measure of exogenous disturbances to monetary policy 
rather than shocks to the demand for monetary aggregates. This shortcoming calls 
into question the structural inferences made from these models and motivates this 
study. The "semi-structural" vector autoregression methodology, initially developed 
by Bemanke and Blinder (1992), grounds structural inference by means of restrictions 
based on Federal Reserve operating procedures - the Federal Reserve responds to past 
and current economic conditions when setting its monetary policy, but policy actions 
feedback to the economy with at least a one-period lag. Following Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), it is argued that the federal fund rate and 
nonborrowed reserves are good measures of monetary policy. Their short-run 
fluctuations are dominated by shifts in the stance of policy, not by nonpolicy 
influence.^ The reduced-form response of relative farm prices to innovations in the 
federal f\mds rate or nonborrowed reserves should measure the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the farm sector. 
The "credit" channel for the transmission of monetary policy is another way 
monetary policy can affect the farm sector. The credit view holds that monetary 
policy affects real economic activity primarily because it affects the extent of financial 
intermediation (bank assets as well as liabilities and the quantity of money). 
" The federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves both can be controlled by the Federal Reserve. 
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Nevertheless, the money and the credit views are not mutually exclusive. Open 
market operations change both the money supply and the amount of loans, so both the 
money and credit channels are operative. The credit channel is important because it 
provides an additional reason why monetary policy may have important effects on the 
economy. Furthermore, the credit view suggests that interest rates and the money 
supply may not be the only indicators of the tightness of monetary policy; the amount 
of bank loans might also be an important indicator. 
The study proceeds as follows. The next chapter reviews the previous literature 
on linking monetary policy actions to the relative farm prices. Chapter 3 develops a 
relative-price model for analyzing the effects of monetary policy shocks on relative 
farm prices. This is followed by a discussion of the credit view of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in chapter 4, which includes a model of the credit channel. 
Chapter 5 reviews the recent literature on monetary policy measures and outlines the 
VAR methodology used in the analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 assess the monthly and 
quarterly monetary policy measures and identify their effects on relative farm prices 
and on net funds raised in the farm sector. A general discussion and concluding 
remarks are given in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The original source of interest in the dynamic responses of relative farm prices 
to a change in monetary policy dates back to Caimes' pioneering study more than a 
century ago (Devadoss and Meyers, 1987). Caimes (1873) predicted that prices of 
crude products with inelastic supply and demand would respond more rapidly than 
those of manufactured goods in the short run to an increase in money supply. Bordo 
(1980) extended Caimes' work to explain the pattern of conunodity price adjustments 
by applying contract theory in a fix-flex price framework (Devadoss and Meyers, 
1987). Bordo's findings suggested that agricultural commodity prices are more 
responsive to monetary changes than are manufactured product prices because 
agricultural products are traded in well-developed auction markets on shorter 
contracts. 
The events of the early 1980s suggested to many economists that monetary 
policy affects relative farm prices - contractionary monetary policy has been blamed 
for falling farm prices and the consequent decline in farm income. However, the 
effect of monetary policy on the farm sector remains controversial. Studies of the 
effects of monetary policy on relative farm prices show conflicting results: some find 
that monetary policy shocks do affect relative farm prices in the short run, and others 
detect no such effect. Economists offered two possible explanations; overshooting of 
flexible agricultural prices in the presence of sticky nonagricultural prices, and shifts 
in relative prices due to imperfect signal extraction. A corresponding body of 
empirical works attempts to verify this prediction, but it is marked by conflicting 
results. 
Applications of the overshooting model include Frankel (1986) and Stamoulis 
and Rausser (1988). Frankel formalized the argument by applying Dombush's (1976) 
overshooting model of exchange rates to agricultural commodity prices. He found 
that monetary policy has important effects on agricultural commodity prices because 
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they are flexible, and other goods prices are sticlQ^. Agricultural commodity prices 
fall more than proportionately to drop in the money supply; they overshoot their new 
long run equilibrium. 
Applications of the imperfect signal-extraction model include Lapp (1990) and 
Belongia (1991). Lapp used an imperfect information, rational expectations model of 
relative farm price determination to test for the relationship between money and 
relative prices of agricultural commodities. His results indicate that variations in the 
growth rate of the nominal money supply (whether anticipated or unanticipated) have 
not been an important influence on the average level of prices received by farmers 
relative to other prices in the economy over the period of 1951-1985. 
Belongia (1991) showed that a variety of model specifications fail to support the 
importance of money on farm prices over his sample period. He estimated alternative 
farm prices models using a common sample period and common data transformations 
and foimd monetary shocks are not important for farm prices. 
Other empirical studies that characterize the controversy differ in specification, 
data definition, sample firequency, and sample period. Orden and Fackler (1989) 
found that identifying policy shocks with the quantity of money variable seems 
particularly inappropriate during their sample period. They argued that if a recursive 
structure is imposed, it is more reasonable to identify shocks to the interest rates with 
monetary policy. 
The results are very similar to those found by Devadoss and Meyers (1987) who 
estimate a bivariate VAR in Ml and the index of prices received by farmers for the 
period 1960-1985. Their empirical results for the U.S. economy strongly support the 
proposition of Caimes and Bordo that agricultural prices respond more rapidly than 
industrial prices to monetary policy shocks. 
Chambers (1985) developed a theoretical model of the interdependence between 
agriculture and financial markets to examine the effects of monetary policy on 
agriculture. His model shows that a restrictive monetary policy may adversely affect 
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the competitive position of an export-oriented sector like agriculture. He empirically 
investigated the results from the theoretical model using VAR techniques. He 
estimated a dynamic system containing Ml and &rm prices using a sample ending in 
the mid 1980s. His empirical analysis shows that monetary policy can have short run 
effects on the agricultural sector. Agricultural prices tend to rise more than 
nonagricultural prices as a result of a monetary expansion. 
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting empirical results of the effects of 
monetary policy on the agricultural sector, Isaac and Rapach (1997) estimate a set of 
models based on previous empirical studies. In contrast with Belongia, they retain the 
model specifications and data transformations used in the previous studies and 
maintain the beginning-of-sample date. When their versions of the models used in 
those studies are estimated using samples extending through 1995, Ml shocks cease 
to be important. Their results suggest that the controversy over the effects of 
monetary policy shocks is an artifact of the sample periods used in previous studies, 
which would explain why sample updating alone allowed them to reconcile the 
conflicting results. They argue that recent outcomes contrast the conventional view 
that positive monetary shocks boost farm prices - the late 1980s witaessed tight 
money and rising farm prices, whUe the early 1990s saw easy money and falling farm 
prices. 
This empirical controversy motivates my work. My primary goal is to identify 
the effects of monetary policy shocks on the farm sector. I present two alternative 
measures of monetary policy shocks - the federal funds rate and nonborrowed 
reserves,^ consider two potential channels for the transmission of monetary policy to 
the farm sector - the "money" channel and the "credit" channel, and apply VAR 
methodology to assess the effects of monetary policy shocks on the farm sector. 
^ Orden and Fackler speculate about whether interest rates are a better gauge of monetary actions than 
money growth. Belongia experimented with different measures of monetary policy. His results showed 
no qualitative change to the results of money growth: neither measure of monetary policy is 
significantly related to relative farm prices. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE EQIHUBRIUM-RELATIVE PRICE MODEL 
The equilibrium relative-price model provides a linkage between monetary 
policy shocks and relative farm prices if aggregate price information is imperfect and 
if supply and demand elasticities in the farm and nonfarm sectors are different. A 
partial-information/localized-market model of the type employed by Lucas (1973) and 
Barro (1976) is used. This model links relative prices to the variance of the monetary 
policy shock. The basic fi:amework is modified by considering each location to be the 
market of a specific commodity, characterized by particular excess supply elasticity. 
Because elasticities vary across markets, monetary policy shocks affect each market 
price differently. 
Further, to take account of the "intertemporal" dimension to supply, the supply 
of output in market i (agricultural products) is specified as primarily determined by 
the price in market i relative to the expected aggregate price level in the next period.'* 
Yt^(i) = a(i) {P,(i) - E[Pt., I lt(i)]} + vt(i), (3.1) 
where a(i) > 0 is the short-run relative supply elasticity in market i, Pt(i) is the price 
of output in market i in period t, E[Pt+i I It(i)] is the expected aggregate price level in 
period t+1 conditional on all the available information in market i at time t, and Vt(i) 
is a normally distributed shock to supply in market i with zero mean and variance o^v 
Similarly, the demand in market i is given as 
Y,'(i) = P(i) {Pt(i) - E[Pt., I lt(i)]} + {Mt - E[P,., I lt(i)]} + ut(i), (3.2) 
* All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
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where P(i) < 0 is the short-nm relative demand elasticity in market i, {Mt - EjTu-i | 
I,(i)]} is the expected real balance effect and Ut(i) is a normally distributed shock to 
demand in market i with zero mean and variance 
The nominal money supply is determined by the monetary authority according 
to the following process: 
Mt = Mt-i + mt, (3.3) 
where mt is a normally distributed, serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock with 
zero mean and variance ar^m- We shall assume that mt is not known at the beginning 
of period t.^ The price in market i moves to equate supply and demand in each period. 
The market equilibrium condition allows us to combine (3.1) and (3.2) to obtain the 
equilibrium price in market i in period t. 
Pt(i) = {l-l/[a(i) - P(i)]} E[Pt., I m] + l/[a(i) - P(i)] H 
+ l/[a(i)-p(i)][ut(i)-vt(i)], (3.4) 
where [a(i) - P(i)] is the relative excess-supply elasticity in market i. Equation (3.4) 
can be written as 
Pt(i) = [I - Y(i)] E[Pt., I It(i)] + Y(i) [Mt + St(i)], (3.5) 
' An objection to this assumption is that people need not be ignorant of monetary shocks as monetary 
Sgures are published regularly. However, they are also revised regularly, and as is well known, the 
Federal Reserve changes its operating procedures over time. The Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) makes decisions on open market operations. The FOMC, composed of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Govemors and regional banks presidents, meets eight times a year to review monetary policy. 
The FOMC's reports on its policy stance are often vague. Typically, its reports mention targets for the 
federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate such as Ml or M2. The directives of the committee are not 
explicit for the quantities of government bonds to buy or sell. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that 
the Federal Reserve has paid much attention to its announced targets. So people acting on the available 
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where y(i) = l/[a(i) - P(i)] and St(i) = [ut(i) - Vt(i)] is a normally distributed relative 
shock to market i with zero mean and variance Substituting (3.3) for Mt in (3.5) 
yields 
Pt(i) = [1 - Y(i)] E[Pt+i I It(i)] + Y(i) [Mm + m, + et(i)]. (3.6) 
The method of undetermined coefBcients is used to solve for the price in market 
i, Pt(i). The solution for Pt(i) in terms of all the predetermined variables and 
exogenous shock is 
Pt(i) = Hi Mt-i + mt + (J.3 et(i)- (3.7) 
Since only Mn is known at time t, it follows that observation of Pt(i) amounts to 
observation of [fi2 mt + ^3 St(i)]. Equation (3.7) implies that the aggregate price level 
can be obtained by averaging Pt(i) across all markets. 
Pt = Hi Mt-i + (I2 mt-^ (3.8) 
Updating (3.8) by one period and taking the rational but conditional expectations of 
Pt+i, we have 
E[Pt.i I It(i)] = E[Mt I It(i)] = E[(Mt., + mt) | It(i)] 
= m Mt-i + Hi E[mt I It(i)]. (3.9) 
infonnation would nonetheless still mistake monetaiy shocks for real ones. If so, monetary shocks will 
affect relative prices. 
® The average value of E,(i) across all markets is approximately zero. 
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Inference on the unobserved monetary shock is made rationally based on the 
stochastic character of the economy. The optimal forecast of mt conditional on It(i), 
which includes and is 
E[mt I It(i)] = [aVCcj'm + o\)] [m, + 8t(i)]/ (3.10) 
Eqxiation (3.10) shows that as the uncertainty associated with monetary policy is 
relatively large, more of [mt + St(i)] is attributed to the monetary policy shock and less 
to the relative real shock. Substituting (3.10) into (3.9), 
E[Pt+i I It(i)] = Mt-i + ^1 {[cr^ni/(cy^m + ct\)] [mt + St(i)]} (3.11) 
then, substituting (3.11) into (3.6), 
Pt(i)=[l - Y (i)] { m M t - ,  + H, {[cy-J(<rm + c\)] [mt + et(i)]}} 
+ y(i) [M,.i + mt + 8t(i)]. (3.12) 
Now, comparing (3.12) to (3.7), we have 
Ml = 1. 
and 
1^2 = {13 = [cr^m + Y(i) cy^]/(CT^m + 
The equilibrium price in market i is 
Pt(i) = Mt-i + {[c-m + Y(i) cy%]/(a^m + a^)} [mt + 8t(i)]. (3.13) 
^ The coaditional expectation of mt is the optimal forecast of m, that minimizes the expected mean 
square error, E{m, - E[m, | I,(i)] | It(i)}". Using a linear forecasting rule for m, such that E[mt | It(i)] = X. 
[mt + et(i)], the expected MSE is minimized with respect to A. and obtain X = + cr J. 
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Averaging (3.13) across all markets yields the aggregate price level, 
Pt = Mt-I + [(CT^m + y <^e)/(c^in + CT^e)] Hit, (3.14) 
where y is the average value of y(i) across all markets. Subtracting (3.14) from (3.13) 
yields the relative price in market i, 
Pt(i) - Pt = {[y(i) - y] + cr^)} m, + {[cr'n, + y(i) + cTe)} e.(i). (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) shows that monetary policy shocks can affect the relative price 
in market i if y(i) y. If supply in the farm sector is less elastic than the average, as is 
usually expected, then monetary policy shocks will have a discernible effect on 
relative farm prices. This interpretation of the model is based on differences in the 
structure of the farm and nonfarm markets. The short-nm elasticity of supply of farm 
products is argued to be less than that of nonfarm products because of differences in 
the production processes. With long lags between production and marketing 
decisions, the ability to adjust farm output in the short run is limited. This 
characteristic of farm production cause relative farm prices to fall initially in response 
to a negative monetary policy shock. The predictions of the model are consistent with 
the view that the relative price of farm products will fall under a contractionary 
monetary policy (see Figure 3.1). 
A contractionary monetary policy shock reduces aggregate demand as people 
find themselves with a shortage of real money balances and an excess supply of 
goods. To restore equilibrium, they reduce spending and cause aggregate demand to 
shift to the left. The shift lowers output and income temporarily and the price level 
permanently. 
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Figure 3.1 The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Relative Farm Prices 
A contractionary monetary policy shock shifts the demand for both farm and nonfarm 
products (equally) to the left. A lower elasticity of supply for farm products will 
cause a larger change in farm prices relative to nonfarm prices, and relative farm 
prices (PF/PNF) will fall. 
Equation (3.15) also implies that monetary policy shocks do not have a long-
lasting effect on the farm sector as relative farm prices are not affected by past 
monetary shocks. Past shocks are not mistaken for real shocks and, therefore, do not 
affect supply or demand. When it is realized that the general decline in aggregate 
demand was due to a contractionary monetary policy shock and not a real shock, the 
aggregate price level will fall to restore the original equilibrium and relative prices. 
The shock is reflected only in a lower aggregate price level in the long run and the 
neutrality of monetary policy is preserved. The direction of change in relative farm 
prices, whether they return to their original values in the long run and the length of the 
adjustment process must be determined empirically. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE CREDIT VIEW OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISM 
The debate on how monetary policy affects the economy focuses on whether it 
occurs through a "money" channel or a "credit" channel. The money channel is the 
conventional view in which monetary policy works by affecting bank deposits and the 
money supply. However, there is disagreement between the traditional Keynesian and 
Monetarist approaches on how changes in the quantity of money affect the economy. 
Monetarists believe that excess money balances have a powerful direct influence on 
expenditures, whereas Keynesians argue that this generates persistent changes in 
interest rates, which lead to changes in the levels of investment and aggregate output. 
However, the traditional literature contains little empirical evidence to support these 
views. 
The "credit" channel for the transmission of monetary policy is another way 
monetary policy can affect the economy. Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) argued that 
monetary policy could also matter by affecting the availability of bank credit in 
contrast to the traditional view. Monetary policy affects real economic activity 
primarily because it affects the extent of financial intermediation (bank assets as well 
as liabilities and the quantity of money). This transmission mechanism arises to the 
extent that the level of bank reserves constrains bank lending, and that the central 
bank can control the real quantity of reserves, say, due to temporary price stickiness. 
The basic credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism is described as 
follows. Suppose that the Federal Reserve conducts open market purchases to 
stimulate the economy. An open market purchase (which raises the monetary base 
and the money supply) increases the quantity of bank loans available. Bank loans 
may play a special role in the economy because certain borrowers such as farmers rely 
heavily on bank credit. This will be the case if banks have special expertise in solving 
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asymmetric infoimatioa problems. The increase in loans will cause investment and 
possibly consimiption expenditures to rise. 
Nevertheless, the money and the credit views of how monetary policy affects the 
economy are by no means mutually exclusive. Open market operations change both 
the money supply and the amount of loans, so both the money and credit channels are 
operative. The credit channel is important because it provides an additional reason 
why monetary policy may have important effects on the economy. Furthermore, the 
credit view suggests that interest rates and the money supply may not be the only 
indicators of the tightness of monetary policy; the amount of bank loans might also be 
an important indicator.^ 
To be more precise, the credit view requires two assumptions: First, when the 
Federal Reserve changes the reserves of the banking system, banks change their 
lending and do not just change their holdings of securities. This will occur as long as 
loans and securities are not perfect substitutes for banks. Second, bank loans are 
special and are not perfect substitutes for other tj^es of credit for borrowers such as 
farmers. If this were not the case, a decrease in bank loans would not imply decreased 
spending because borrowers would just increase their borrowings elsewhere when 
bank loans decrease. 
Bemanke and Gertler (1987) develop a simple general equilibrium model of 
banking and macroeconomic behavior that stresses the role of banks in easing credit 
flows and emphasizes the importance of the financial sector. It has a different setting 
than the Arrow-Debreu world underlying the Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958). 
The Modigliani and Miller theorem asserts that, given perfect capital markets, real 
economic decisions do not depend on financial stmcture. An implication of the theorem 
is that financial intermediaries do not affect real activities. Bemanke and Gertler 
analysis shows that the banking sector is important to the macroeconomy and that 
* This justifies using a measure of bank reserves such as nonborrowed reserves or total reserves as 
measures of monetary policy. 
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monetaiy policy matters for real activities by affecting the flow of bank credit. Banks 
play an important role in real allocation of resource and are not merely financial veils. 
The key characteristic feature of the banking sector is its cost advantage in loan 
evaluation and monitoring, which allows banks to provide intermediary services 
between lenders and borrowers. Information gained firom loan evaluation and 
monitoring remains with the bank to motivate the heavy reliance on banks for debt 
financing. 
As argued by Gurley and Shaw (1956), the traditional analysis of bank liabilities 
becomes less relevant as the number of substitutes for conventionally defined money 
increases. The alternative approach is to consider bank assets as well as bank 
liabilities. The credit view emphasizes the availability of bank credit and eliminates 
any specialness of bank liabilities. It focuses on the implications of possible 
nonsubstitutability between bank and non-bank credit. This is potentially usefiil for 
understanding the macroeconomic effects of contractionary monetary policy that 
would force a reduction in bank loans. Borrowers such as farmers who rely on bank 
credit might not be able to acquire fimds at all.' Factors that affect the ability of 
banks to provide loans will decide the scale of banking and the flow of bank credit 
and will have real effects. 
Currently, there is an active debate on the relative importance of the money and 
credit channels, and much new research is being conducted on this topic. Although 
the importance of the credit channel has not yet been fully established, research on it 
is giving us a richer view on the channels through which monetary policy affects the 
economy. Whether monetary policy matters by affecting bank assets or bank 
liabilities is an empirical issue. The empirical evidence thus far is mixed. Part of the 
' An important implication of the credit view is that monetary policy will affect smaller borrowers, who 
are more dependent on bank loans, more than large borrower who can access the credit markets directly 
without going through banks. This result is exactly what Gertler and Gilchris (1994) have found. 
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problem may be due to the general difGculty in discerning structural relationships 
from the data. 
A Model of the Credit Channel 
The model embodies the credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
It takes a step toward quantifying the role of credit market imperfections in the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks to the farm sector, and provides additional 
understanding of the role of financial intermediaries in farming activities. 
The broad credit channel for monetary policy will be considered here instead of 
the "bank-lending" channel. This version of the credit channel focuses on the supply of 
funds from all financial intermediaries and has no special role for banks. This seems 
more appropriate for the farm sector, which relies heavily on borrowing from 
intermediaries such as the Farm Credit System (FCS), insurance companies and the 
Farmer Home Administration (FmHA) as well as commercial banks. 
The broad credit channel stresses that all forms of external finance are imperfect 
substitutes for internal funds. Information asymmetries induce a cost premium for 
external funds as compensation to lenders for the expected costs of monitoring and 
evaluation. Importantly, the size of this premium depends on the stance of monetary 
policy. In particular, a tightening of policy raises the opportunity cost of fimds for 
lenders, and also increases the premium for all types of external fimds, thus depressing 
the volume of lending. This rise in the premium occurs because the tighter policy 
causes borrower's balance sheet to deteriorate, reducing the collateral that could be 
offered to a potential lender. 
The model is designed to illustrate how credit market imperfections may amplify 
the impact of monetary policy shocks on the farm sector. The objective here is to 
explore the consequences of a monetary policy shock on credit flow to the farm 
sector. This is done by investigating changes in the production and borrowing 
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decisions of fanners as a result of changes in monetary policy. The model also looks 
for changes in the relationship between internal finance (balance sheet conditions) and 
input expenditure after a monetary policy shock. 
The broad credit view is illustrated in a simple partial equilibrium model of 
farmer investment decision adapted firom Gertler and Hubbard (1988). It is intended 
for expository purposes to capture some of the basic aspects of investment and 
financial decisions of farmers and trace the effects of monetary policy shocks on the 
farm sector. 
To motivate the demand for credit, we assume there is a one-period delay 
between expenditure of inputs and realization of output. The representative farmer 
uses labor L and (possibly) capital K (machinery) to produce a random quantity of 
output Y, which becomes available to sell in the next period. Output is the numeraire 
good, and each input has its price normalized at unity. There are two possible output 
states - "good" with probability tCg and "bad" with probability Kb - which are realized 
after the expenditure decision is made. 
The farmer can improve the probability of a good output realization if he uses 
enough capital with a given quantity of labor to improve the productivity of labor. 
Output in the next period is given by 
^ f F C L ) ,  w i t h  l i k e l i h o o d s  I  
[a F(L), with likelihood TCb J 
and (4.1) 
Y = aF(L), ifK = 0. 
The production function F(L) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing 
and strictly concave with F(0) = 0, F(0) = oo and F(<») =0; Ttg + Tib = 1; 0 < a < I; p > 
0; and the random output realization is specific to the farmer. 
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The &rmer will either use PL units of capital or none at all. If the expected gain 
in output is more than the associated cost, for any level of labor employed, then it is 
efScient to use capital. Formally, this requires one to assume that 
(Kg + Ttb a) F(L) - (L + PL) > a F(L) - L. 
If there are no informational asymmetry, the farmer expenditure decision is to 
choose L to satisfy 
(7Cg + 7rba)F(L)-(l+p)r = 0, (4.2) 
where r is the gross interest rate. Equation (4.2) simply states that, at the optimum, 
the expected marginal benefit firom an additional unit of labor (given a 
complementary addition of P units of capital) equals the marginal cost of investing. 
The value of L that satisfies equation (4.2), L*, does not depends on any financial 
variables, and the Modigliani and Miller theorem applies. 
The conventional money view of the monetary transmission mechanism is easy 
to illustrate in this case. To the extent that an open market sale raises the required rate 
of return on lending r, investment demand falls. This is the usual interest rate channel 
often identified with the money view. 
However, under asymmetric information, the intermediary understands there is a 
temptation to misuse the borrowed funds and thus modifies the loan contract to 
reduce such incentives. One consequence of this modification is that actual labor, L, 
may be less than desired labor, L*, and this gap will depend inversely on the farmer's 
net worth. The farmer has some initial liquid asset position W and collateralizable 
land X worth a present value of X/r. Hence, the farmer's initial net worth is [W + 
(X/r)]. So long as W < L*, the farmer may have to borrow from a competitive 
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financial intermediary to finance his input expenditure. The quantity borrowed B is 
given by 
B = [(1+P)L-W]. 
The loan contract specifies a payment pg to the intermediary in the event of the 
"good" outpixt level, and a payment pb in the event of the 'Tiad" output level. 
The competitive intermediary's expected return R® from the loan contract must 
equal its opportunity cost of fimds, which equals the interest rate r times the quantity 
borrowed B. Given L, R® must satisfy 
7igPg + 7tbPb = r[(l+p)L-W].'° (4.3) 
Given the underlying incentive problem, the contract must give the farmer the 
incentive to invest in capital as a complementary input to labor. It must satisfy the 
"incentive constraint" 
(Ttg + Kb a) F(L) - (Kg Pg + 7tb pb) > [a F(L) - pb] + r PL. (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) states that the farmer expected gain from using PL units of capital 
exceeds the gain from diverting the borrowed fimds to other uses. 
One way in which the intermediary could reduce the farmer's temptation to 
divert the borrowed funds is to increase the amount of pb that the farmer must pay it 
in the event of a bad outcome. The farmer, however, can only credibly promise to pay 
available assets in the "bad" state. These are the sum of the gross revenue he earns in 
It is assumed, for simplicity, that the intermediary simply channels fimds from lenders to borrowers, 
and uses no resources. 
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the "bad" state and the market value of his land. The following "feasibility condition" 
influences the contract: 
Pb<aF(L) + X. (4.5) 
The farmer's borrowing and production problem is to choose L, pg and pb that 
maximize his expected profits 7c®(L; W; r; P), 
7u®(L; W; r; P) = Max. {(TCg + TCb a) F(L) - Tig pg - Ttb Pb}, (4.6) 
L 
subject to equations (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) - the feasibility condition that he can never 
pay the intermediary more than his realized output. 
As long as the incentive constraint in equation (4.4) does not bind, actual labor 
expenditure L simply adjusts to desired one L* and the pattern of contract payments is 
indeterminate. When the incentive constraint binds, financial and investment 
decisions are no longer independent. First, when the incentive constraint binds, it is 
desirable to raise pb to the maximum extent possible; therefore, the limited liability 
constraint in equation (4.5) also binds. Using (4.3) and (4.5), one can eliminate pg 
and Pb from equation (4.4), and thereby obtain a relation among L, r and internal net 
worth: 
[(7tg + TCb a) F(L)] - (1+2P)] r L + r [W + (X/r)] = 0. (4.7) 
When equation (4.7) holds, input expenditure is an increasing fimction of the farmer's 
net worth [W + (X/r)], holding investment opportunities constant: 
dL/d[W + (X/r)] = {(1+2P) - (TCg + Kb a) [F'(L)/r]}-' > 0. (4.8) 
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The explanation for this effect is that, when the incentive constraint binds, an increase 
in internal net worth increases the amount of feasible investment. 
The existence of the "broad" credit channel precludes neither the traditional 
interest rate channel nor the bank-lending channel. To see the former, note an 
increase in lender's opportunity cost of funds on account of a monetary contraction 
reduces desired investment L* (since L* is determined by (% + TCb cx) F(L) = (l+(3) r). 
To see the latter, to the extent that banks face a higher marginal opportunity cost of 
funds because of a less than perfectly elastic supply schedule for managed liabilities 
(and farmers lack access to nonbank finance), the increase in r lowers both desired 
and actual spending. 
This simple framework is consistent with the description of the financial 
accelerator mechanism: The cost of uncollaterized external finance exceeds that for 
internal finance. This gap varies inversely with the internal net worth of the farmer 
and a decline in net worth reduces the farmer's spending, given everything equal. The 
framework also yields simple testable predictions related to these money view and 
credit view arguments. 
It is also useful to note that L depends inversely on the gross interest rate r, even 
when the incentive condition constraints expenditure below the first-best optimum. 
The rise in r magnifies the incentive problem by worsening the farmer's financial 
position, thus increasing his gains from cheating (relative to being honest) and the 
level of expenditure L declines accordingly. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry of information between farmers and intermediaries 
adds a premium to the cost of borrowing. The opportunity cost of borrowing r can be 
decomposed into a risk-free interest rate rRp, which is taken as the monetary policy 
instrument, and a risk premium Q(B, rap) to compensate the intermediaries for costs 
incurred m evaluating and monitoring farmers: 
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r = trf + fi(B, trf). 
The size of Q increases with the level of borrowing and the level of the risk-free rate. 
In part because increase in the rate lower the discounted value of fanners' net worth, 
thereby increasing the expected default cost. 
The dependence of Q on the risk-free rate implies that credit market 
imperfections can act to magnify the effect of monetary policy shocks on the farm 
sector. This increase in the cost of borrowing causes investment decisions to be more 
sensitive to fluctuations in net worth after a monetary contraction. 
24 
CHAPTERS. MEASURES OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS 
The VAR Methodology 
The relative-price model provides a linkage between monetary policy shocks 
and agricultural activity. The "credit" view adds another channel for the transmission 
of monetary policy to the farm sector. A general econometric methodology is 
presented to obtain quantitative measures of the direction, size and persistence of this 
linkage and channel. The method builds on the "semi-structural" VAR approach, 
used in this context by Bemanke and Blinder (1992); Strongin (1992); and Christiano, 
Eichenbaimi, and Evans (1996), among others. The semi-structural VAR model 
leaves the relationships among variables in the system unrestricted, but imposes 
contemporaneous identifying restrictions on a set of policy variables relevant to the 
conduct of monetary policy. It extracts information about monetary policy from the 
market for bank reserves. The "semi-structural" VAR yields impulse responses and 
variance decompositions that can be given structural interpretations. It helps unlock 
economic information embedded in the reduced-form model. 
This method involves three basic steps. First, based on institutional analysis of 
Federal Reserve operating procedures, a policy variable or combination of variables 
that measure the stance of policy are identified. Bemanke and Blinder (1992) chose 
the federal fimds rate. Strongin (1992) used a measure closely related to the ratio of 
nonborrowed reserves to total reserves. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) 
chose both the federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves as measures of monetary 
policy. Second, a standard VAR system including the relevant macroeconomic 
variables and the policy variables with policy variables ordered last is estimated. This 
structure imposes the restriction that the Federal Reserve responds to 
contemporaneous information, but that policy shocks feedback to the economy with at 
least a one-period delay. Finally, the impulse response functions for the nonpolicy 
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variables in the system are calculated. These provide estimates of the dynamic 
response of the variables in the VAR system to monetary policy shocks. 
The standard linear, simultaneous equations model is a useful starting point for 
understanding the semi-structural VAR approach. A simultaneous equations system 
models the dynamic relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables. The 
dynamic structural system can be written as'' 
AXt = B(L)Xt-i + Et, (5.1) 
where Xt is an n-vector of endogenous variables, A is an n x n matrix of the structural 
parameters on the contemporaneous endogenous variables, B(L) is a k''' degree matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator L, that is, B(L) = Bo + Bi L + Ba L" + ... + Bk L'', where 
all the B matrices are square, and E, is an n-vector of serially uncorrected structural 
disturbances to the structural equations. Solving for Xt yields the "reduced-form" 
VAR representation for Xt, 
Xt = C(L)Xt-,+Ut, (5.2) 
where C(L) = A"' B(L) and Ut = A*' Et. Equation (5.2) shows how reduced-form 
VAR coefiBcients are related to the underlying structural coefficients, which are not 
separately identifiable. 
The VAR approach uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate (5.2). An 
estimate of the variance-co variance matrix of the VAR disturbances, Su = E(UtUt'), is 
readily obtained from the OLS residuals. Since Ut = A"' Et, then 
Zu = A-'ZEA-'', (5.3) 
'' Boldface letters indicate vectors or matrices of variables or coefGcients. 
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where the variance-covariance matrix of the structural disturbances Ze = ECEtEO-
A particular specification for the structural disturbances Et is required to identify 
the structural shocks. The Choleski factorization assumes that Ze is diagonal and A*' 
is lower triangular with the main diagonal elements normalized to one. The structural 
shocks are identified since Et = A Uf'^ 
The dynamic response of the variables in the system to the policy shocks can 
then be measured by the impulse response functions. These functions can be 
interpreted as the true structural responses to policy changes (assimiing that the linear 
structure is invariant).'^ They are based upon the moving average representation 
(VMA) for Xf The VMA for the VAR is obtained by a simple transformation of the 
VAR for Xt. Take the VAR model for Xt from (5.2) and subtract C(L) Xt.i from both 
sides of equation (5.2), 
Xt-C(L)Xt.,=Ut. 
However, the Choleski factorization suffers from the problem of imposing a "semi-structural" 
interpretation on a mechanical procedure. Bemanke (1986) and Sims (1986) have proposed alternative 
ways of looking at the factorization problem, which impose more of an economic structure. The 
innovation model is 
U, = A"' EB where ZE is a diagonal matrix. 
We need to minimize with respect to the free parameters in A"' and Ze the likelihood-based fimction: 
-2 log|A| + logjSEl + Trace(SE'' A Su A'), 
where Sy is the sample variance-covariance matrix of the VAR disturbances. Concentrating out Se 
simplifies this to minimizing 
-2 log|A| + Z log(A Su A')ii. 
It is also important to construct confidence intervals for the estimates. One way to do this is the 
Monte Carlo integration technique. This is a Bayesian procedure that presimies that the structural 
shocks E in equation (5.1) are independendy and identically, normally distributed. 
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Then factor Xt using the lag operator, 
[I-C(L)L]Xt = Ut, 
and multiply both sides of this equation by the inverse of [I - C(L) L], 
Xt = [I - C(L) L]-' U,. 
Now, insert the expression for Ut (= A"' Et) into this last equation, 
Xt = [I - C(L) L]-' A-' E, = 0(L) Et, (5.4) 
where ©(L) = Z©; L', and each 0i is an n x n matrix of parameters from the structural 
1=0 
model. Equation (5.4) implies that the response of Xt+i to Et is ©i- Hence, the 
sequence of ©i from i = 0, 1,2,..., illustrates the dynamic response of the variables to 
the shocks. If the variable in X is stationary, then the impulse response must 
approach zero as i becomes larger. 
Variance decompositions allocate each variable's forecast error variance to the 
policy shocks. These statistics measure the quantitative effect that the shocks have on 
the variables. If Et_j Xt is the expected value of Xt based on all information available 
at time t-j, the forecast error is 
X,-E,-,X,= f;0, E„ , 
1=0 
since the information at time t-j includes all E occurring at or before time t-j and the 
conditional expectation of future E is zero because the shocks are serially 
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uncorrelated. The forecast error variances for the individiial series are the diagonal 




If 0ivs is the (v, s) element in 0i and CTs is the standard deviation for disturbance s (s 
1,, n), the j-step-ahead percentage of forecast variance of the v'*' variable is 
E(X,-E^,XO^=f; 
isO S=I 
, v = 1,2,..., n. 
The variance decomposition function (<I>) shows the j-step-ahead percentage of 
forecast error variance for variable v attributable to the k*** shock. 




The above strategy will be applied to measure the dynamic effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the farm sector. The reduced-form VAR system of equation (5.2) 









where Yt is an ni-vector of macroeconomic variables. It describes a set of structural 
relationships in the economy. While Pt is an n2-vector of policy variables measuring 
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monetary policy. It may be interpreted as the Federal Reserve reaction fimction based 
on a structural model for the bank reserves market, and ni+n2 = n. 
To identify the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on the various 
nonpolicy variables Y, without necessarily having to identify the entire model 
structure, the VAR system of equation (5.5) is written as 
Uv. A-^ [0]' Ev. 
Upt. 
.w Ept. 
The nonpolicy shocks Ey and the policy shock Ep are serially uncorrelated 
structural shocks - the independence from contemporaneous economic conditions is 
part of the definition of an exogenous policy shock. Further, this partitioning of the 
a ' matrix imposes a recursive contemporaneous structure that can be given a 
particular economic rationale - monetary policy shocks affect the economy with at 
least a one-period lag. 
The nonpolicy variables Y depend on their current and lagged values and on 
only the lagged values of the policy variables P, that is, A is lower triangular with 
the main diagonal elements normalized to one.''* This assumes the nonpolicy 
innovations to the policy shocks do not feed back into the rest of the economy during 
the current period. This assumption is obviously more plausible if the time period is 
short, and if the nonpolicy variables do not include variables that are likely to respond 
quickly to policy changes such as interest rates. 
An alternative identifying assumption discussed by Beraanke and Blinder (1992) is that the policy­
maker does not respond to contemporaneous information. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) 
compare the results obtained by these two alternative assumptions; they prefer the assumption that 
policy does not feedback to the economy within the period, although most of their results do not 
depend strongly on which assumption is used. I foimd my estimates to be relatively invariant to the 
identifying assumption, suggesting that the policy shock is not highly contemporaneously correlated 
with other disturbances in the system. 
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The policy measure P depends on current and lagged values of Y and P. It 
provides an overall measure of the policy stance. The exogenous policy shock Ep is 
given by 
U P =  E Y+ A ; ' E P. (5.7) 
This is a standard semi-structural VAR system that relates observable VAR 
residuals Up to the unobserved structural shocks Ey and Ep, thus allowing the 
recovery of the structural monetary policy shocks Ep. This method can give robust 
and plausible measures of the behavior of many macroeconomic variables to a 
monetary policy shock despite the minimal identifying assumptions. However, one 
important caveat should be offered. Measuring monetary policy accurately is 
important for evaluating alternative monetary transmission mechanisms, and 
estimating the effects of monetary policy. The VAR methodology depends on the 
choice of monetary policy measure being a valid one. It should depend on the Federal 
Reserve operating procedures - whether the Federal Reserve targets interest rates or 
reserve aggregates. 
Federal Reserve Operating Procedures 
Traditionally, changes in the stance of monetary policy were measured by 
changes in the growth rate of monetary aggregates such as Ml or M2. However, the 
growth rates of monetary aggregates typically depend on a variety of nonpolicy 
influences. For example, if the Federal Reserve operating procedure involves some 
smoothing of short-term interest rates, as has been the case for most of the past thirty 
years, then shocks to money demand will be partially accommodated by the Federal 
Reserve. As a result, growth rates of monetary aggregates will reflect changes in 
money demand as well as changes in monetary policy. Changes in velocity caused by 
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financial innovation and deregulation are a further barrier to using growth rates of 
monetary aggregates as measures of monetary policy. 
In choosing an operating strategy, the Federal Reserve attempts to achieve a 
desired degree of monetary policy restraint, ease or tightness, by focusing on the 
reserve market conditions - reserve supply relative to demand, and the associated 
level of the federal flmds rate. The considered reserve levels are based on the Federal 
Reserve's desire to induce short-run monetary and financial conditions that will help 
to achieve policy goals for the economy. 
In principle, the Federal Reserve can directly control the quantity of reserves by 
not accommodating observed fluctuations in the demand for reserves. However, this 
will result in firee movements in the federal funds rate. Alternatively, the Federal 
Reserve can control the federal funds rate by adjusting the supply of reserves to meet 
all changes in the demand for reserves. This will allow the quantity of reserves to 
vary fireely. Over the years, the actual approach has been adapted to changing 
circimistances. Sometimes the emphasis has been on controlling the quantity of 
reserves; other times, the federal funds rate. 
Considering the Federal Reserve's operating procedures overtime will give us a 
feeling for the evolution of the monetary policy process and an understanding of some 
of the subtleties of how the procedures were implemented overtime. By the late 
1960s, the rising criticism of procyclical monetary policy and concerns about inflation 
finally led the Federal Reserve to abandon its focus on money market conditions.'^ In 
the early 1970s the Federal Reserve stated that it was committing itself to the use of 
monetary aggregates as intermediate targets. But monetary policy did not cease to be 
procyclical. It was as procyclical in the 1970s as in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
conduct of monetary policy did not improve because the Federal Reserve operating 
" The result after a few years of monetary expansion was high and rising inflation. Inflation rose from 
less than 2% in 1960 to nearly 6% in 1969. 
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procedmes during the period suggest that its commitment to targeting monetary 
aggregates was not very strong. 
The Federal Reserve would set target ranges for the growth rate of various 
monetary aggregates such as Ml and would determine what federal funds rate (the 
interest rate on overnight loans between banks of their deposits at Federal Reserve 
Banks) it thought consistent with these aims. The Federal Reserve would then try to 
meet both sets of targets. But interest-rate targets and monetary aggregate targets 
might not be compatible. The federal funds rate may begin to climb out of its target 
band when the demand for Ml is growing too rapidly. In this case, the Federal 
Reserve would give precedence to the federal flmds rate target. 
The Federal Reserve was actually using the federal funds rate as its operating 
target. So an unexpected rise in income (which would cause the federal funds rate to 
hit the top of its target band) would then induce open market purchases and a too 
rapid growth of the money supply. The Federal Reserve then would try to bring 
money supply growth back on track by raising the target range on the federal funds 
rate. However, if income continued to rise unexpectedly, money growth would 
overshoot again. This is exactly what happened from June 1972 to June 1973, when 
the economy boomed unexpectedly: Ml growth greatly exceeded its target, increasing 
at approximately an 8% rate, while the federal funds rate climbed from 41/2% to 8'/2%. 
The economy soon became overheated, and inflationary pressures began to mount. 
The opposite chain of events occurred at the end of 1974, when the economic 
contraction, from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raising 
the price of oil in 1973, was far more severe than anyone had predicted. The federal 
funds rate fell dramatically from over 12% to 5% and persistently biunped against the 
bottom of its target range. The Federal Reserve conducted open market sales to keep 
the federal fimds rate from falling, and money growth dropped precipitously, actually 
turning negative by the begirming of 1975. Clearly, this sharp drop in money growth 
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when the United States was experiencing one of the worst economic contractions of 
the postwar era was a serious mistake. 
Using the federal funds rate as an operating target promoted a procyclical 
monetary policy despite the Federal Reserve lip service to monetary aggregate targets. 
If the Federal Reserve really intended to pursue monetary aggregate targets, it seems 
peculiar that it would have chose an interest rate for an operating target rather than a 
reserve aggregate.'® The explanation for why the Federal Reserve chose an interest 
rate as an operating target is that it was still very concerned with achieving interest-
rate stability and was reluctant to relinquish control over interest-rate movements. 
The incompatibility of the Federal Reserve policy procedure with its stated intent of 
targeting monetary aggregates had become very clear by October 1979, when the 
Federal Reserve policy procedures underwent drastic revision. 
Concerned over rapidly accelerating inflation in the late 1970s, the Federal 
Reserve sought changes in its operating procedures in order to control money growth 
more effectively. In October 1979, the Federal Reserve began targeting nonborrowed 
reserves (supply of reserves excluding discount loans), which the Federal Reserve 
would set after estimating the volume of discount loans the banks would borrow. The 
Federal Reserve allowed the federal flmds rate to fluctuate freely within a wide and 
flexible range. Under this approach, the targeted path for nonborrowed reserves was 
based on the Federal Reserve's growth objectives for Ml. Ml growth in excess of the 
Federal Reserve's objectives would cause the depository institutions' demand for 
reserves to outpace the nonborrowed reserves target, putting upward pressures on the 
funds rate and other short-term rates. The rise in interest rates, in turn, would reduce 
the growth in checkable deposits and other low-yielding instruments, bringing money 
stock growth back toward the Federal Reserve's objectives. 
The success of Japanese monetary policy in the 1978-1987 period using an interest rate as an 
operating target, in contrast to the lack of success in the 1970-1979 period in the Unites States when the 
Federal Reserve used a similar operating procedure, suggest that using an interest rate as an operating 
target is not necessarily a barrier to successful monetary policy. 
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Controlling the money supply was never really the intent of the Federal 
Reserve's policy shift Despite the Federal Reserve's statements aboxit the need to 
target monetary aggregates, it was not committed to these targets. Rather, it was far 
more concemed with using interest-rate movements to wring inflation out of the 
economy. The Federal Reserve's primary reason for changing its operating 
procedures was to free its hand to manipulate interest rates in order to fight inflation. 
It was necessary to abandon interest-rate targets if the Federal Reserve were able to 
raise interest rates sharply when a slowdown in the economy was required to dampen 
inflation. Not sinprisingly, the federal fimds rate underwent much greater fluctuations 
after it was deemphasized as an operating target. 
The interest-rate movements reflected the change in Federal Reserve's strategy. 
After the October 1979 announcement, interest rates soared, with the prime rate 
averaging 15.3% in 1980. With the imposition of credit controls in March 1980 and 
the rapid decline in real GDP in the second quarter of 1980, the Federal Reserve eased 
up on its policy and allowed interest rates to decline sharply. When recovery began in 
July 1980, inflation remained persistent, still exceeding 10%. Because the inflation 
fight was not yet won, the Federal Reserve tightened the screws again, sending short-
term rates above the 15% level for a second time. The prime rate averaged 18.9% in 
1981 and 14.9% in 1982. The 1981-1982 recession and its large decline in output and 
high unemployment began to bring inflation down. Inflation fell from 13.5% in 1980 
to 1.9% in 1986 (aided by a decline in oil prices). With inflationary psychology 
apparently broke, interest rates were allowed to fall. 
The reserve targeting procedure from 1979 to 1982 gradually came to provide 
assurance to financial markets and the public that the Federal Reserve is committed to 
fight inflation. Monetary policy was instnmiental in sharply lowering the inflation 
rate, albeit a significant increase in interest rate volatility and a marked decline in 
output. 
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The historical relationship between Ml and the economy broke down in the 
early 1980s, leading the Federal Reserve to deemphasize its control of Ml during 
1982. In late 1982, the Federal Reserve abandoned the formal reserve targeting 
procedure and moved toward accommodating short-run fluctuations in the demand for 
reserves, while limiting their effects on t he federal fimds rate. Subsequently, ongoing 
deregulation and financial innovation precluded a return to the use of numerical 
objectives for Ml and the nonborrowed reserve targeting procedure. 
As a consequence, since 1982 the Federal Reserve's operating procedures have 
focused on achieving a particular degree of tightness or ease in reserve market 
conditions rather than on the quantity of reserves. Specifically, the Federal Reserve 
expresses its operating directives in terms of a desired degree of reserve pressure (the 
costs and the availability of reserves to the banking system) which is associated with 
an average level of the federal fimds rate. The approach for evaluating the degree of 
reserve pressure, however, has changed over time. Discount window borrowing 
targets were used as the main factor for assessing reserve availability conditions 
during 1983-87, but they have not played a significant role through much of the 
subsequent period. 
Under the current approach, the Federal Reserve uses the federal funds rate as 
the principal guide for evaluating reserve availability conditions and indicates a 
desired level of the federal funds rate. This judgmental approach involves estimating 
the demand for and supply of reserves, and accommodating all significant changes in 
the demand for reserves through adjustments in the supply on nonborrowed reserves. 
It allows for only modest variations in the fimds rate around the level intended by the 
Federal Reserve. 
Recent attempts to provide measures of monetary policy have fallen into two 
general categories: First, following Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer and Romer 
(1989) used the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee to determine changes 
in the Federal Reserve policy position. An appealing aspect of their approach is that 
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it attempts to use additional information about the Federal Reserve intentions to 
identify monetary policy shocks. Their strategy has the advantage of being 
"nonparametric". It does not require any modeling of the Federal Reserve operating 
procedures and is potentially robust to changes in them. However, a disadvantage of 
this approach, beside its inherent subjectivity, is the difficulty in distinguishing 
between endogenous and exogenous policy changes (Bemanke and Mihov, 1995), 
which is necessary for identifying the effects of monetary policy on the economy. 
A second general strategy is to use information about the Federal Reserve 
operating procedures to develop measures of monetary policy. For example, 
Bemanke and Blinder (1992) argue that over much of the past thirty years 
(particularly before 1979) the Federal Reserve has implemented policy changes 
primarily through changes in the federal funds rate. They argue that the fimds rate (or 
the spread between the funds rate and a long-term bond rate) may be used as a 
measure of monetary policy. 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), among several studies, argued that 
innovations in broad monetary aggregates primarily reflect shocks to money demand 
rather than shocks to money supply, considering the actual operating procedures of 
the Federal Reserve. Pursuing altemative assumptions for identifying monetary 
policy shocks, they provide empirical evidence in support of the federal fimds rate as 
a measure of monetary policy. They also proposed using nonborrowed reserves (the 
instrument that is perhaps the most directly controlled by the Federal Reserve) as a 
measure of monetary policy. They found that the responses of interest rates and other 
macro variables to innovations in nonborrowed reserves matched prior notions of how 
monetary policy shocks are supposed to affect the economy. 
A potential problem with the Bemanke-Blinder and Christiano-Eichenbaum 
measures of monetary policy is that each presimies a constant set of operating 
procedures by the Federal Reserve. Strongin (1992) proposed a measure that could 
accommodate some changes in the operating procedures. He identifies monetary 
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policy shocks as innovations to nonborrowed reserves, holding total reserves fixed. 
He motivates his measure by arguing that the Federal Reserve is constrained to meet 
total reserve demand in the short run (failure to do so would lead to wild swings in the 
federal fimds rate). However, it can effectively tighten policy by reducing 
nonborrowed reserves and forcing banks to borrow more from the discount window. 
An important advantage of Strongin's approach is that, because it allows the 
projection coefBcient of nonborrowed reserves on total reserves to vary over time, it 
is able to nest alternative operating procedures. For example, a policy in which the 
Federal Reserve fully accommodates shocks to the demand for reserves (the 
projection coefBcient of nonborrowed reserves on total reserves is unity) is essentially 
equivalent to a strategy targeting the federal funds rate as in Bemanke and Blinder. 
Alternatively, a strategy of targeting nonborrowed reserves, as suggested by 
Christiano and Eichenbaum, can be represented by a zero response of nonborrowed 
reserves to total reserves growth. 
Storagin's key assumptions are that the level of total reserves is largely 
determined by the Federal Reserve's short run accommodation of the demand for 
reserves, and that policy iimovations are reflected in the mix of borrowed and 
nonborrowed reserves used to meet short-run demand for reserves. Specifically, 
policy innovations are measured by using the iimovation in total reserves to extract 
changes in the reserve mix between borrowed and nonborrowed reserves that are due 
to the accommodation of reserve demand shocks, leaving only those changes in the 
mix which are truly policy innovations. This identification implies that the demand 
for total reserves is perfectly inelastic with respect to the flmds rate, so that an open 
market purchase that increases nonborrowed reserves is exactly matched by a 
decrease in discount loans. However, when excess reserves are positive, the demand 
for reserves is not completely interest inelastic. The opportunity cost of total reserves 
is a function of the supply of total reserves and is independent of the composition of 
total reserves between borrowed and nonborrowed reserves (Goodfriend, 1982). His 
38 
specijScation also ignores the possibility that the Federal Reserve responds to 
borrowing shocks. 
Bemanke and Mihov (1995) adopt a strategy similar to Strongin's where they 
employ a specification of the bank reserves market that can accommodate a variety of 
alternative operating procedures, institutional features, and identifying restrictions. 
They estimated models of the Federal Reserve operating procedure for different 
periods. They found that the federal fimds rate is an excellent measure of monetary 
policy for the 1965-79 period, but more recently, the best indicator is one that 
combines information fi:om both the federal fimds rate and a measure of reserves. 
On the whole, the Federal Reserve operating procedures have changed over time 
and, hence, no single policy measure may be best for an extended time period. Thus, 
I followed Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) in using the federal fimds rate 
and nonborrowed reserves as the monetary policy measures. Innovations to those 
policy measures are the policy shocks. The effects of monetary policy shocks are then 
identified by the dynamic responses of variables in a VAR model to the innovations. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE EFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS ON 
FARM PRICES 
The above strategy will be followed to identify monetary policy shocks and 
assess the effects of these shocks on relative farm prices using a monthly VAR. The 
procedure requires the inclusion of both policy variables and nonpolicy variables in 
the VARs.'^ The policy variables are: the monthly average of the daily federal funds 
rate (FF); minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD); and the log of total 
reserves (TOTRES). Data for NBRD and TOTRES are seasonally adjusted and 
adjusted for changes in reserve requirements. The nonpolicy variables are: the output 
level (Y) - measured by the index of industrial production; the price level (?) -
measured by log of the all-item consumer price index for urban consumers, CPI-U; 
and the commodity price index (PCOM) - measured by the smoothed change in 
sensitive materials prices.^® 
The commodity price index (PCOM) was included in the VAR system in order 
to capture additional information available to the Federal Reserve about the future 
course of inflation. The exclusion of the commodity price index tends to lead to the 
"price puzzle," the finding that monetary contraction leads to a rising rather than 
falling price level. Sims (1992) showed that this problem can be eliminated by 
including a variable in the VAR that proxies for the Federal Reserve information 
about future inflation. For example, the Federal Reserve responds to a commodity 
price index or the exchange rate in setting monetary policy. Christiano, Eichenbaum 
The issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary exists. Sims (1980) and Doan 
(1996) recommend against differencing even if the variables contain a unit root. They argue that the 
goal of the VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among variables, not the parameter 
estimates. The main argument against differencing is that it "throws away" information concerning the 
comovements in the data (such as cointegrating relationships). Similarly it is argued that the data need 
not be detrended. In a VAR, a trending variable will be well approximated by a unit root plus drift. 
However, the majority view is that the form of the variables in the VAR should mimic the true data-
generating process. This is particularly true if the aim is to estimate a structural model. 
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and Evans (1996) found that including the commodity price index and measuring the 
general price level by an index that treats housing costs correctly, such as the GDP 
deflator or personal consumption expenditure (PCE), largely eliminates the price 
puzzle. Experimentation with these variables suggests that the results are quite 
robust. 
As was also noted in the previous chapter, there are two possible identifying 
assimiptions: That policymakers have contemporaneous information about nonpolicy 
variables (implying that the policy variables should be ordered last in the VAR), and 
that policymakers know only lagged values of the nonpolicy variables (implying that 
the policy variables should be ordered first). My results turned out to be not terribly 
sensitive to the ordering chosen. Thus, only results based on the assumption that 
policymakers have contemporaneous information about the nonpolicy variables are 
reported. 
Assessing the Monthly Monetary Policy Measures 
To assess the monthly monetary policy measures, I consider the benchmark FF 
and NBRD policy shocks that emerge firom six-variable VARs that include Y, P, 
PCOM, FF, NBRD, and TOTRES in the vector Xt in (5.2). When FF is specified as 
the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, and TOTRES. When 
NBRD is specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, NBRD, FF, 
and TOTRES. In both cases, the VAR was estimates using monthly data over the 
period 1960:01-1995: ID, using 12 lags of the variables in the system." 
All data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) except for PCOM, ^^ch 
was obtained from the Survey of Current Business, October 1995, Volume 75, Number 10, Page C-47, 
Series 99. 
" The VAR lag length is often selected by statistical criteria such as the modified likelihood ratio test 
of Sims (1980) which is based on sample size. Sims argued that conventioaal likelihood ratio test is 
too conservative in favor of acceptance of the null hypothesis. He suggested a modified likelihood 
ratio statistic: 
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Using the modified likelihood ratio test of Sims (1980), a lag length of 12 
months seems most appropriate. Reducing the lag length from 24 months to 12 
months had a Xz value that was significant at the 0.05 level, and reducing the lag 
length to 6 months had a Xi value that was also significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the 
test results suggested longer lags than 12, but given degrees-of -freedom 
considerations, i.e., exhausting the degrees of freedom with longer lags,^° I decided to 
use 12 lags. Using monthly data makes a lag length of 12 months sufBciently long to 
capture the system dynamics. 
To smooth the policy shock measures, their three-month, moving average is 
reported in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The estimated standard deviation of the FF policy 
shock is 0.48%, at an annual rate, while the estimated standard deviation of the 
NBRD policy shock is 0.0154. As Figure 6.1 suggests, the estimated standard 
deviation of the FF policy shocks is influenced by the high variance of those shocks in 
the early 1980s. 
In describing the results, monetary policy is characterized as "contractionary" 
when the policy shock is positive and "expansionary" when it is negative. According 
to the FF policy shock, monetary policy was relatively contractionary before each 
recession, and became expansionary around business cycle troughs. A similar pattern 
is observed for the NBRD policy shock, except in the 1981-82 period, monetary 
L(k) = (T-C)(ln|ZR|-ln|Z„|), (6.1) 
vs^ere T is the number of usable observations, C is a correction fector to improve small sample 
properties (Sims recommended that C equals the number of parameters estimated in the unrestricted 
system), and Zaand ^ determinants of variance/covariance matrix of the residuals in the restricted 
and unrestricted models. Under the null hypothesis that lag length = k, the statistic, L(k), converges to 
X2(df) where the degree of freedom (df) is the number of linear restrictions. 
In a VAR, appropriate lag-length selection can be critical. If k is too small, the model is 
misspecified; and if k is too large, degrees of freedom are wasted. Long lag lengths quickly consume 
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Figure 6.1 Three-Month, Moving Average of FF Policy Shock 
The policy shock is as the orthogonalized innovations from a 6-variabIe monthly 
VAR which includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price 
index (P), the conmiodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the 
log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The 
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Figure 6.2 Three-Month, moving Average of NBRD Policy Shock 
The policy shock is as the orthogonalized innovations from a 6-variabIe monthly 
VAR which includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price 
index (P), the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed 
reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). 
The shaded areas indicate recessions, as dated by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
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policy was expansionary at the start, very contractionary in the middle, and 
expansionary at the end of the recession. 
Figures 6.3 to 6.14 display the impulse response functions of the variables in the 
VAR model to the policy shocks. Middle lines represent the point estimates, while 
upper and lower lines denote plus and minus one standard deviation bands.^' 
Considering the effects of a contractionary FF policy shock, several observations are 
worth emphasizing. First, after a delay of about 3 to 4 months, the FF policy shock 
leads to a sustained and statistically significant drop in output. This is consistent with 
the results in Bemanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992). Second, the FF policy 
shock leads to sharp and persistent decline in PCOM. The inclusion of PCOM in the 
analysis is important for resolving the "price puzzle". However, P increases for about 
one year after the shock, then begins to decline steadily.^ The initial rise is 
statistically significant indicating there is still remaining a small "price puzzle". This 
is may be from the mortgage cost component of the CPI playing a large role in the rise 
in the price level. Third, the effect of the FF policy shock on the federal funds rate is 
persistent, with the funds rate staying up for approximately a year and a half after the 
shock. Fourth, the FF policy shock generates a statistically significant decline in 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD goes up). This is consistent with the presence of a 
strong liquidity effect and with the view that Federal Reserve raises interest rates by 
selling U.S. government securities. Fifth, the fall in total reserves is negligible 
initially (actually, the point estimates show a small and statistically significant fall). 
Eventually total reserves fall by around 0.2%. So, according to the FF policy shock, 
the Federal Reserve insulates total reserves in the short run from the full impact of a 
The standard errors were computed using the Monte Carlo method described in Doan (1996) using 
500 draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficients and the covariance 
matrix of the innovations, in (S.2). 












-0.84 —— —— — ^— 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Month(s) Ahead 
Figure 6.3 Response of Y to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.4 Response of P to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.5 Response of PCOM to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.6 Response of FT to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal fimds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.7 Response of NBRD to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.8 Response of TOTRES to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.9 Response of Y to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal fimds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.10 Response of P to NBRD Policy Shock. 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal funds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.11 Response of PCOM to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal fiinds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.12 Response of NBRD to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variabie monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal funds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.13 Response of FF to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal fimds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
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Figure 6.14 Response of TOTRES to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variabIe monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal frmds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse 
responses are constructed at 48 months horizon. 
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decrease in nonborrowed reserves.^ Strongin (1995) discusses this point in details. 
As for the effects of the NBRD policy shock, with one exception, inference is 
quite robust to which of the two policy measures is used. The exception has to do 
with the degree to which total reserves are initially insulated from policy shocks. The 
FF measure implies that total reserves are insulated contemporaneously from 
monetary policy shocks, while the NBRD measure implies that roughly 30% of the 
policy shock is contemporaneously transmitted to total reserves. 
The monthly monetary policy measures are used to identify the effects of 
monetary policy shocks on other macroeconomic variables. Variables such as Ml 
money supply (Ml) - measured by the log of Ml money supply; the unemployment 
rate (UNRATE); and the level of employment (EMPL) - measured by the log of total 
nonfarm payroll employment, are closely related to monetary policy actions."'* When 
FF is specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, 
TOTRES, and D, where D is either Ml, UNRATE, or EMPL. When NBRD is 
specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, NBRD, FF, 
TOTRES, and D. Figures 6.15 to 6.20 display the impulse responses of M1, 
UNRATE, and EMPL to the policy shocks. 
Consistent with the interpretation of a positive FF policy shock as reflecting a 
contractionary monetary policy. Ml declines in a statistically significant way. With 
an initial delay, similar to that of output, the FF policy shock leads to a significant 
increase in the unemployment rate and a significant decrease in employment. The 
dynamic response fimctions are qualitatively similar whether we work with FF or 
NBRD policy shocks. 
^ A given percentage change in total reserve and nonborrowed reserves correspond roughly to an equal 
dollar change in these variables. Historically nonborrowed reserves are roughly 95% of total reserves. 
Since 1986, the ratio has moved up, being above 98% most of the time. 
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Figure 6.15 Response of Ml to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal ftmds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of 
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Figure 6.16 Response of UNRATE to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal fiinds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the 
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Figure 6.17 Response of EMPL to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variabIe monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of 
total nonfarm payroll employment (EMPL). The impulse responses are constructed at 
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Figure 6.18 Response of Ml to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variabIe monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal funds rate (FF), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of MI 
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Figure 6.19 Response of UNRATE to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal fimds rate (FF), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the 
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Figure 6.20 Response of EMPL to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal fimds rate (FF), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of total 
nonfann payroll employment (EMPL). The impulse responses are constructed at 48 
months horizon. 
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the variance decompositions for each variable - the 
percentage of the forecast error variance attributable to the policy shock. The FF 
policy shock accounts for 41%, 8.2% and 30.9% of the 48-month ahead forecast error 
variance of output, the unemployment rate, and employment, while the NBRD policy 
shock accounts for 5.5%, 0.3%, and 0.5%. So, monetary policy shocks seem to be an 
important contributor to aggregate fluctuations. The effects associated with FF policy 
shock are much larger than those associated with NBRD policy shock. The forecast 
standard errors increase towards an upper bound for each variable indicating that the 
VAR system is stationary. 
In summary, the results in this section support the view that FF and NBRD 
policy shocks are reasonable measures of monetary policy shocks. Other alternative 
interpretations seem implausible. For example, the view that a contractionary FF 
policy shock really reflects a contractionary shock to money demand (rather than 
supply) seems hard to square with the finding that total reserves and Ml fall after an 
FF policy shock. The view that a contractionary NBRD policy shock reflects a 
contractionary money demand shock is difBcult to reconcile with the fact that it is 
followed by a rise in the interest rate and the unemployment rate, as well as a fall in 
output. The view that contractionary FF policy shock reflects an increase in 
household and/or business optimism seems hard to reconcile with the fall in aggregate 
economic activity that follows the FF policy shock. Finally, a rise in interest rates due 
to a shock generating a sectoral reallocation of resources, such as an oil price shock, 
could lead to an initial fall in aggregate economic activity. However, this seems 
implausible given the persistence of the fall in aggregate economic activity that occurs 
after contractionary FF and NBRD policy shocks. 
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Table 6.1 Variance Decompositions for the Variables in the VAR Model 
Montfa(s) FF Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock Shock 
Y 1 0.0% (0.464) 0.0% (0.462) 
6 3.1% (1.396) 0.8% (1.396) 
12 19.9% (2.071) 4.3% (2.071) 
24 42.0% (3.000) 6.8% (3.000) 
48 41.0% (4.394) 5.5% (4.3947) 
P 1 0.0% (0.002) 0.0% (0.002) 
6 4.8% (0.006) 0.5% (0.006) 
12 2.9% (0.011) 0.5% (0.011) 
24 1.7% (0.025) 0.8% (0.025) 
48 15.6% (0.051) 1.1% (0.051) 
PCOM 1 0.0% (0.111) 0.0% (0.111) 
6 1.7% (0.614) 0.4% (0.614) 
12 5.4% (0.758) 0.9% (0.758) 
24 7.5% (0.869) 1.0% (0.869) 
48 6.8% (0.928) 1.1% (0.928) 
FF I 94.8% (0.484) 7.1% (0.484) 
6 63.5% (1.414) 6.4% (1.414) 
12 43.9% (1.798) 4.4% (1.798) 
24 28.0% (2.271) 3.4% (2.271) 
48 25.5% (2.688) 2.8% (2.688) 
NBRD 1 7.2% (0.016) 96.7% (0.015) 
6 10.5% (0.037) 89.3% (0.037) 
12 6.7% (0.048) 55.3% (0.048) 
24 3.3% (0.072) 26.1% (0.072) 
48 3.1% (0.086) 18.5% (0.086) 
TOTRES 1 2.6% (0.008) 16.7% (0.008) 
6 1.1% (0.020) 19.7% (0.020) 
12 2.2% (0.033) 14.4% (0.033) 
24 2.7% (0.052) 6.5% (0.052) 
48 4.4% (0.066) 4.0% (0.066) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2 Variance Decompositions for Other Macroeconomic Variables 
Moath(s) FF Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock Shock 
Ml 1 1.3% (0.003) 4.0% (0.003) 
6 22.8% (0.011) 13.0% (0.011) 
12 26.8% (0.019) 12.0% (0.019) 
24 26.8% (0.031) 7.4% (0.031) 
48 34.8% (0.039) 6.8% (0.039) 
UNRATE 1 0.7% (0.148) 0.2% (0.148) 
6 0.6% (0.401) 0.0% (0.401) 
12 3.7% (0.593) 0.4% (0.593) 
24 10.9% (0.790) 0.5% (0.790) 
48 8.2% (1.119) 0.3% (1.119) 
EMPL 1 0.1% (0.002) 0.0% (0.002) 
6 3.3% (0.006) 0.1% (0.006) 
12 12.6% (0.011) 0.5% (0.011) 
24 29.8% (0.019) 0.4% (0.019) 
48 30.9% (0.032) 0.5% (0.032) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Farm Prices 
The monetary policy measures are used to identify the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on relative farm prices (FP) - measured by the index of prices received 
by farmers deflated by the CPI-U.^^ When FF is specified as the policy shock, the 
VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, TOTRES, and FP. When NBRD is 
specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, NBRD, FF, 
TOTRES, and FP. 
^ Farm prices measured by the index of prices received by farmers were obtained from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Figures 6.21 to 6.22 display the impulse response functions of FP to monetary 
policy shocks. A contractionary FF policy shock leads to an immediate and sustained, 
statistically significant drop in relative farm prices. The impulse response fimction of 
FP to NBRD policy shock is qualitatively similar though statistically not as 
significant. Actually, the point estimates show a small, statistically significant fall. 
These findings are consistent with the Caimes-Bordo theory that agricultural prices 
respond more rapidly than industrial prices to monetary policy shocks. 
Table 6.3 shows that a relatively small proportion of the forecast error variance 
of FP can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. Given the size and number of real 
agricultural shocks, these shocks obviously account for much of FP volatility. Thus, 
it appears that the linkage between monetary policy and the agricultural sector, while 
statistically significant, is weaker than effects arising directly within the agricultural 
sector. However, as time wears on, monetary policy shocks explain successively 
more and more of the forecast error variance in FP. 
As a check on the robustness of the results, the monthly VAR model is 
reestimated using a different ordering with total nonfarm payroll employment 
(EMPL) included. Employment is an important measure of the performance of the 
economy that policy makers watch and utilize in the formulation of policy. Total 
nonfarm payroll employment (EMPL) is used instead of the unemployment rate 
(UNRATE) because it is based on much more solid statistical information 
(establishment survey data) than is the unemployment rate (household survey data). 
Figures 6.23 and 6.24 display the effects of FF and NBRD policy shocks on FP. As 
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Figure 6.21 Response of FP to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
mcludes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal fimds rate (FF), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the farm 
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Figure 6.22 Response of FP to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the federal funds rate (FF), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the farm price 
index (FP)- The impulse responses are constructed at 48 months horizon. 
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Table 6.3 Variance Decompositions for Farm Prices 
Month(s) FT Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock* Shock** 
FP 1 0.5% (0.180) 0.2% (0.180) 
6 5.2% (0.425) 0.2% (0.425) 
12 10.3% (0.597) 0.7% (0.597) 
24 16.3% (0.743) 2.0% (0.743) 
48 22.2% (0.823) 2.5% (0.823) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
* The estimates come from a 7-variable monthly VAR which includes the index of 
industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), the commodity price 
index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves 
(NBilD), the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the farm price index (FP). 
** The estimates come from a 7-variable monthly VAR which includes the index of 
industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), the conunodity price 
index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds 
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Figure 6.23 Response of FP to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variabIe monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the log of total nonfarm payroll employment 
(EMPL), the federal fimds rate (FF), and the farm price index (FP). The impulse 










10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Month(s) Ahead 
Figure 6.24 Response of FP to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable monthly VAR which 
includes the index of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price index (P), 
the commodity price index (PCOM), the log of total nonfarm payroll employment 
(EMPL), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the farm price index 
(FP). The impulse responses are constructed at 48 months horizon. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE EFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS ON NET 
FUNDS RAISED IN THE FARM SECTOR 
The procedure of the previous chapter will be followed to assess monetary 
policy shocks and identify their effects on net funds raised in the farm sector using a 
quarterly VAR. The policy variables are: the quarterly average of the daily federal 
funds rate (FF); minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD); and the log of total 
reserves (TOTRES). Data for NBRD and TOTRES are seasonally adjusted and 
adjusted for changes in reserve requirements. The nonpolicy variables are: the output 
level (Y) - measured by the log of GDP in constant 1992 dollars; the price level (P) -
measured by the log of 1992 GDP deflator (P); and the commodity price index 
(PCOM) - measured by the quarterly average of the smoothed change in sensitive 
materials prices."^ 
Assessing the Quarterly Monetary Policy Measures 
To assess the monetary policy measures, again I consider the benchmark FF and 
NBRD policy shocks that emerge fi-om six-variable quarterly VARs that include Y, P, 
PCOM, FF, NBRD, and TOTRES in the vector Xt in (5.2). Again, when FF is 
specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, and 
TOTRES. When NBRD is specified as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, 
PCOM, NBRD, FF, and TOTRES. In both cases, the VAR was estimates using 
quarterly data over the period 1960:1-1995:2, using 4 lags of the variables in the 
system. 
The quarterly VAR lag length is selected by the same lag test used for the 
monthly VAR. Again, under the null hypothesis that lag length = k, the statistic, L(k) 
All data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) except for PCOM, which 
was obtained from the Survey of Current Business, October 1995, Volume 75, Number 10, Page C-47, 
Series 99. 
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in (6.1), converges to XiCdf) where the degree of freedom (df) is the number of linear 
restrictions. It seems that a lag length of 4 quarters was most appropriate. Reducing 
the lag length from 12 quarters to 8 quarters had a ^2 value that was significant at the 
0.05 level, and reducing the lag length to 4 quarters had a Xi value that was 
significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the test results suggested longer lags than 4 
quarters, but, given degrees-of -fireedom considerations, I decided to use 4 lags. 
Using quarterly data makes a lag length of 4 quarters sufficiently long to capture the 
system dynamics. 
The estimated standard deviation of the FF policy shock is 0.59%, at an annual 
rate, while the estimated standard deviation of the NBRD policy shock is 0.0172. As 
Figure 7.1 suggests, the estimated standard deviation of the FF policy shocks is 
influenced by the high variance of those shocks in the early 1980s. 
According to the FF policy shock, monetary policy was relatively contractionary 
before each recession, and became expansionary around busuiess cycle troughs. A 
similar pattern is observed for the NBRD policy shock, except in the 1981-82 period, 
monetary policy was expansionary at the start, very contractionary in the middle, and 
expansionary at the end of the recession. 
Figures 7.3 to 7.14 display the impulse response functions of the variables in the 
VAR model to the policy shocks. Middle lines represent the point estimates, while 
upper and lower lines denote plus and minus one standard deviation bands."^ The 
impulse response functions are very similar to the corresponding response functions 
obtained in the monthly VARs. After a delay of about 1 to 2 quarters, a 
contractionary FF policy shock leads to a sustained and statistically significant drop in 
output. The impact of the FF policy shock on the federal fvmds rate is consistent and 
induces a drop in nonborrowed reserves that last about two quarters, as well as longer 
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Figure 7.1 FF Policy Shock 
The policy shock is as the orthogonalized innovations from a 6-variable quarterly 
VAR which includes the log of industrial production (Y), the log of consimier price 
index (P), the commodity price index (PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the 
log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The 
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Figure 7.2 NBRD Policy Shock 
The policy shock is as the orthogonalized iimovations from a 6-variable quarterly 
VAR which includes the log of industrial production (Y), the log of consumer price 
index (P), the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed 
reserves (NBRD), the federal flmds rate (FF), and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). 
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Figure 7.3 Response of Y to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
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Figure 7.4 Response of P to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal frmds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
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Figure 7.5 Response of PCOM to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 












0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Quarter(s) Ahead 
Figure 7.6 Response of FF to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NTBRD), 
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Figure 7.7 Response of NBRD to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
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Figure 7.8 Response of TOTRES to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
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Figure 7.9 Response of Y to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
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Figure 7.10 Response of P to NBRD Policy Shock. 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal fimds rate (FF), 
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Figure 7.11 Response of PCOM to NBRD PoUcy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variabIe quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal flmds rate (FF), 
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Figure 7.12 Response of NBRD to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variabIe quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
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Figure 7.13 Response of FF to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
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Figure 7.14 Response of TOTRES to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal fimds rate (FF), 
and the log of total reserves (TOTRES). The impulse responses are constructed at 24 
quarters horizon. 
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lasting decline in PCOM. P, measured by the GDP deflator, does not respond for 
about a year, after which it begins a steady decline. This is qualitatively similar to the 
response of P, measured by the CPI, in the monthly VARs. Still a small "price 
puzzle" remains. The fall in total reserves is negligible initially. Eventually they fall 
by around 0.4%. So, according to the FF policy shock measure, the Federal Reserve 
insulates total reserves in the short run from the full impact of a decrease in 
nonborrowed reserves. 
As for the effects of the NBRD policy shock, with one exception, inference is 
quite robust to which of the two policy measures is used. The exception has to do 
with the degree to which total reserves are initially insulated from policy shocks. The 
FF measure implies that total reserves are insulated contemporaneously from 
monetary policy shocks, while the NBRD measure implies that roughly 40% of the 
policy shock is contemporaneously transmitted to total reserves. 
The quarterly monetary policy measures are used to identify the effects of 
monetary policy shocks on Ml, UNRATE, and EMPL. Again, when FF is specified 
as the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, TOTRES, and D, 
where D is either Ml, UNRATE, or EMPL. When NBRD is specified as the policy 
shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, NBRD, FF, TOTRES, and D. Figures 7.15 
to 7.20 display the impulse responses of Ml, UNRATE, and EMPL to the policy 
shocks. 
Consistent with the interpretation of a positive FF policy shock as reflecting a 
contractionary monetary policy. Ml declines in a statistically significant way. With 
an initial delay, similar to that of output, the ET policy shock leads to a significant 
increase in the unemployment rate and a significant decrease in employment. The 
dynamic response functions are qualitatively similar whether we work with FF or 
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Figure 7.15 Response of Ml to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal flmds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of Ml money supply (Ml). The 
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Figure 7.16 Response of UNRATE to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the unemployment rate (UNRATE). The 
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Figure 7.17 Response of EMPL to FF Policy Shoclc 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal fimds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of total nonfarm payrolls (EMPL). 
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Figure 7.18 Response of Ml to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of Ml money supply (Ml). The 
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Figure 7.19 Response of UNRATE to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the unemployment rate (UNRATE). The 
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Figure 7.20 Response of EMPL to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses come from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and the log of total nonfarm payrolls (EMPL). 
The impulse responses are constructed at 24 quarters horizon. 
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Tables 7.1 and 12. show the variance decompositions for each variable - the 
percentage of the forecast error variance attributable to the policy shock. The FF 
policy shock accounts for 31.9%, 3.5% and 23% of the 24-quarter ahead forecast error 
variance of output, the unemployment rate, and employment, while the NBRD policy 
shock accounts for 0.6%, 0.2%, and 0.2%. Similar to the monthly VAR, monetary 
policy shocks seem to be an important contributor to aggregate fluctuations. The 
effects associated with FF policy shock are much larger than those associated with 
NBRD policy shock. The forecast standard errors increase towards an upper bound 
for each variable indicating that the VAR system is stationary. 
In summary, the results in this section support the view that FF and NBRD 
policy shocks are reasonable measures of exogenous monetary policy shocks. Other 
alternative interpretations seem implausible. For example, the view that a positive FT 
policy shock really reflects a positive shock to money demand (rather than supply) 
seems hard to square with the finding that total reserves and Ml fall after an FF policy 
shock. The view that a positive NBRD policy shock reflects a negative money 
demand shock is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it is followed by a rise in the 
interest rate and the unemployment rate, as well as a fall in output. The view that 
positive FF policy shock reflects an increase in household and/or business optimism 
seems hard to reconcile with the fall in aggregate economic activity that follows the 
FF policy shock. Finally, a rise in interest rates due to a shock generating a sectoral 
reallocation of resources could, in principle, lead to an initial fall in aggregate 
economic activity. The obvious candidate is a shock to the price of oil. However, 
this scenario seems implausible given the persistence of the fall in aggregate 
economic activity that occurs after FF and NBRD policy shocks. 
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Table 7.1 Variance Decompositions for the Variables in the VAR Model 
Quarter(s) FF Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock Shock 
Y 1 0.0% (0.006) 0.0% (0.006) 
4 12.5% (0.014) 0.7% (0.014) 
8 28.6% (0.022) 0.7% (0.022) 
12 31.1% (0.030) 0.6% (0.030) 
24 31.9% (0.040) 0.6% (0.041) 
P I 0.0% (0.002) 0.0% (0.002) 
4 0.3% (0.008) 0.1% (0.008) 
8 0.5% (0.016) 0.1% (0.016) 
12 3.2% (0.026) 0.1% (0.026) 
24 16.2% (0.049) 0.1% (0.049) 
PCOM 1 0.0% (0.341) 0.0% (0.341) 
4 4.7% (0.657) 0.3% (0.657) 
8 10.3% (0.759) 0.5% (0.759) 
12 9.6% (0.797) 0.5% (0.800) 
24 9.5% (0.811) 0.5% (0.811) 
FF 1 84.9% (0.890) 14.0% (0.890) 
4 52.1% (0.757) 6.2% (1.757) 
8 35.6% (2.230) 4.0% (2.230) 
12 33.0% (2.332) 3.7% (2.332) 
24 30.4% (2.568) 3.1% (2.568) 
NBRD 1 16.4% (0.025) 99.4% (0.025) 
4 9.3% (0.046) 52.6% (0.046) 
8 4.8% (0.070) 24.7% (0.070) 
12 3.8% (0.079) 19.5% (0.079) 
24 2.9% (0.092) 14.6% (0.092) 
TOTRES 1 0.8% (0.010) 13.0% (0.010) 
4 1.7% (0.031) 13.6% (0.031) 
8 1.9% (0.050) 6.4% (0.050) 
12 1.5% (0.062) 4.3% (0.062) 
24 1.2% (0.073) 3.1% (0.073) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
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Table 7.2 Variance Decompositions for Other Macroeconomic Variables 
Quarter(s) FF Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock Shock 
Ml 1 2.2% (0.006) 10.6% (0.006) 
4 12.8% (0.017) 16.2% (0.017) 
8 11.1% (0.029) 9.5% (0.029) 
12 11.2% (0.034) 7.1% (0.034) 
24 19.4% (0.040) 5.6% (0.040) 
UNRATE 1 7.0% (0.215) 6.7% (0.215) 
4 2.6% (0.565) 2.3% (0.565) 
8 4.1% (0.746) 4.5% (0.746) 
12 3.9% (0.986) 4.5% (0.986) 
24 3.5% (1.189) 0.2% (1.189) 
EMPL 1 3.1% (0.003) 0.9% (0.003) 
4 2.3% (0.010) 0.5% (0.010) 
S 15.7% (0.015) 0.3% (0.015) 
12 23.8% (0.020) 0.2% (0.020) 
24 23.0% (0.027) 0.2% (0.027) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Net Funds Raised in the Farm Sector 
The monetary policy measures are used to identify the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the borrowing and lending activities of the farm sector. Specifically, 
the Flow of Funds Accounts (FOFA) data is used to identify the effects of a monetary 
policy shocks on net fimds raised in the farm sector. Real net flmds raised in the farm 
sector (FARMNET) as measured by the FOFA data, equals the amount of funds 
raised in the farm sector by issuing financial liabilities, net of fimds spent acquiring 
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financial assets.^^ Again, when FF is specified as tiie policy shock, the VAR ordering 
is Y, P, PCOM, FF, NBRD, TOTRES, and FARMNET. When NBRD is specified as 
the policy shock, the VAR ordering is Y, P, PCOM, NBRD, FF, TOTRES, and 
FARMNET. 
Figures 7.21 and 7.22 display the impulse response of FARMNET to monetary 
policy shocks. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, net fimds raised in the 
farm sector increases for roughly two quarters. Then, as the recession induced by the 
policy shock takes hold, net farm borrowing declines. The decline is not significant 
for the NBRD policy shock. In this sense the inference about the response of net 
funds raised in the farm sector to monetary policy shocks is fi:agile. 
There are important fiictions that cause this response pattem of net funds raised 
to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The initial rise in the net fimd raised may 
reflect deterioration in farmer's cash flow firom a Ml in sales. It is difficult for 
farmers to quickly alter their nominal expenditures. Eventually, they reduce their 
nominal expenditures and net fimds raised in the farm sector decline as predicted by 
the credit view. 
It is worth the effort to investigate this conjecture and identify the frictions that 
inhibit farmers from quickly adjusting their real expenditures. This points out to the 
importance of imperfect information and the special role of bank credit. Agricultural 
financial markets used to operate in considerable isolation. The markets were 
segmented in terms of both the demand and supply of credit. A fragmented banking 
system, limited geographic markets, and the predominance of small businesses with 
 ^The Flow of Funds Accounts (FOFA) data is from the Federal Reserve's Z.1 Statistical Release of 
the second quarter of 1995. The data was seasonally adjusted by the reporting agency. Net funds 
raised in the ferm sector (FARMNFT) is given by the minus of line 12 in table F.102 converted to 1992 
dollars using the seasonally adjusted GDP deflator. As more data is included in Z.1 Statistical Release, 
the line number of the tables not correspond exactly to the line number referred to in Guide to the 
Flaw of Funds Accounts (1993). Since the Guide also contains the original data source for the Flow of 
Funds Accounts, its line numbering convention is followed. 
100 
limited borrowing opportunities resulted in limited integration of rural areas into 
national financial markets. 
Table 7.3 shows that a relatively small proportion of the forecast error variance 
of FARMNET can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. In the short nm, 
monetary policy shocks do not account for much of FARMNET volatility, while in 
the long run, they have a modest effect on the variation in FARMNET. However, as 
time wears on, monetary policy shocks explain successively more and more of the 
forecast error variance in FARMNET. 
As a check on the robustness of the results, the quarterly VAR model is 
reestimated using a different ordering with total nonfarm payroll employment 
(EMPL) included. Figures 7.23 and 7.24 display the effects of FF and NBRD policy 
shocks. As can be seen, the basic results are quite robust to specification. 
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Quarter(s) Ahead 
Figure 7.21 Response of FARMNET to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variabIe quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and net funds raised in the farm sector 
(FARMNET). The impulse responses are constructed at 24 quarters horizon. 
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Quarter(s) Ahead 
Figure 7.22 Response of FARMNET to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variabIe quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), 
the log of total reserves (TOTRES), and net funds raised in the farm sector 
(FARMNET). The impulse responses are constructed at 24 quarters horizon. 
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Table 7.3 Variance Decompositions for Net Funds Raised in the Farm Sector 
Quarter(s) FF Policy NBRD Policy 
Variable Ahead Shock* Shock** 
FARMNET I 0.1% (7075.5) 1.2% (7075.6) 
4 1.0% (8663.9) 1.1% (8663.9) 
8 6.3% (9169.4) 1.9% (9169.4) 
12 9.9% (9470.6) 2.0% (9470.6) 
24 11.9% (10035.2) 2.1% (10035.2) 
Note: Standard errors of forecast are in parentheses. 
* The estimates come from a 7-variabIe quarterly VAR which includes the log of 
GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index (PCOM), the 
federal funds rate (FF), minus the log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the log of 
total reserves (TOTRES), and net fimds raised in the farm sector (FARMNET). 
** The estimates come from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which includes the log of 
GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index (PCOM), minus the 
log of nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), the federal funds rate (FF), the log of total 
reserves (TOTRES), and net fimds raised by the farm sector (FARMNET). 
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Quarter(s) Ahead 
Figure 7.23 Response of FARMNET to FF Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 6-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the log of total nonfarm payroll employment (EMPL), the federal fimds rate 
(FF), and net funds raised in the farm sector (FARMNET). The impulse responses 
are constructed at 24 quarters horizon. 
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Figure 6.24 Response of FARMNET to NBRD Policy Shock 
The impulse responses comes from estimates from a 7-variable quarterly VAR which 
includes the log of GDP (Y), the log of GDP deflator (P), the commodity price index 
(PCOM), the log of total nonfarm payroll employment (EMPL), minus the log of 
nonborrowed reserves (NBRD), and net funds raised in the farm sector (FARMNET). 
The impulse responses are constructed at 24 quarters horizon. 
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CHAPTERS. CONCLUSION 
This study applied vector autoregression methodology to develop VAR based 
monetaiy policy measures, and used similar identifying restrictions to those used in 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) to identify the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on the farm sector. It considered two potential channels for the transmission 
of monetary policy to the farm sector - the "money" channel, where a relative-price 
model was used to explain the effect of monetary policy shocks on relative farm 
prices; and the "credit" channel, where the Flow of Funds Accounts (FOFA) data was 
used to assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the farm sector. 
The empirical results for the U.S. economy support the Caimes-Bordo theory 
that agricultural product prices respond faster to monetary policy shocks than do 
manufactured product prices. Contractionary monetary policy shocks have a negative 
effect on relative farm prices because farm product prices decrease relatively more 
than nonfarm product prices. The dynamic response function shows a steady and 
persistent decline in relative farm prices after a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
An important focus of the analysis is the response of net funds raised in the farm 
sector to monetary policy shocks. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, net 
fimds raised in the farm sector increase for roughly a year, then decline. The initial 
rise in the net funds raised reflects the difficulty for farmers to quickly alter their 
nominal expenditures. Eventually, they reduce their nominal expenditures and net 
fimds raised decline as predicted by the credit view. 
In light of this, I have showed, using monetary policy measures based on the 
Federal Reserve's operating procedures, that monetary policy shocks have an 
important effect on the farm sector. Although there are some differences between the 
two policy shock measxires considered, the basic qualitative response of the system to 
the two policy shock measures is quite robust. 
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I have confined myself to identification schemes that correspond to imposing 
Wold casual orderings on the innovations in VARs. By no means does this exhaiist 
the class of identifying assumptions that have been used in the literature. One 
alternative class of identifying assumptions involves restrictions on the long-run 
impact of monetary policy shocks. Another alternative class of identifying 
assvunptions employs noiuscursive schemes of the type considered by Bemanke 
(1986) and Sims (1986), among others. These are sometimes referred to as structural 
VARs. It would be of interest to investigate the sensitivity of inference to adopting 
these types of identifying restrictions as well. 
Although the identification method works by tracing out the effects of 
unanticipated policy shocks, this approach takes no stand on whether it is only 
unanticipated monetary policy that matters. It is possible that anticipated policy 
changes have a stabilizing effect on the economy. Measuring this effect, however, 
requires the imposition of more economic structure in the analysis. Because the 
"semi-structural" VAR method does not account for the possibly stabilizing effects of 
anticipated policy changes, this approach cannot tell us whether the policy has been 
stabilizing or destabilizing during the sample period. Thus, variance decompositions 
that attribute a given percentage of the variance of prices or net flmds raised to 
monetary policy can be misleading. At best, the variance decomposition exercise may 
suggest the amount by which more predictable policies could have reduced the 
variances of prices or net funds raised in a given sample period. 
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